



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26 April 1966

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
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26 April 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

25X1

2. Cambodia-Vietnam: Sihanouk making new attempt at political accommodation with Vietnamese Communists. (Page 3)

[REDACTED]

25X1

4. Tanzania: Zanzibar continues to resist Nyerere's efforts for closer integration. (Page 6)

[REDACTED]

25X1

6. Notes: Ecuador; [REDACTED]

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25X1

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Cambodia-Vietnam: Sihanouk is apparently making a new attempt at a political accommodation with the Vietnamese Communists.

In a 24 April speech, he claimed that Cambodia would sign agreements with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front at a forthcoming "summit meeting." He did not, however, spell out what the agreements would cover and it appears that this has not yet been fully resolved. Sihanouk stated that there were still points in dispute which remain to be negotiated before the "bases" for "peaceful coexistence" between Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists can be established.

Sihanouk's last effort to reach a formal understanding with the Communists foundered in late 1964 when Hanoi rejected his demands for special status for ethnic Cambodians living in South Vietnam. In the intervening months Sihanouk characterized Hanoi's position as an example of "Vietnamese perfidy." The recent granting of diplomatic status to Hanoi's commercial delegation in Phnom Penh, however, suggests that more careful preparations have been made this time for reaching at least a limited Cambodian-Vietnamese agreement.

Sihanouk's objective in pushing for a political understanding with the Communists at this juncture is not clear. It may be related to a growing realization that the Communists will need to make greater use of Cambodian territory as the war in South Vietnam intensifies and a desire to restrict future Vietnamese demands in this regard.

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26 Apr 66

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Tanzania: [On the second anniversary of the Tanzanian union, Zanzibar continues to resist efforts by President Nyerere for closer integration and is mounting new attacks on the US presence.]

[Zanzibar's Communists in the island's ruling Revolutionary Council, apparently encouraged by bloc officials, are accelerating their efforts to force the removal of the US Consulate. Earlier this month their pressure caused the closing of the USIS library and the removal of the US public affairs officer. They now appear to have convinced Tanzanian Vice President Karume, who heads their local government, that the US consul is involved in a counterrevolutionary plot.]

[The Zanzibaris argue that the Americans were responsible for the coups in Ghana and Indonesia and have established a firm grip on Kenya. Many Tanzanians expect the next imperialist blow to fall on them, as leaders in the effort to eliminate white rule in southern Africa.]

[The Zanzibaris' anti-US tack may also be designed to disrupt Nyerere's efforts to consolidate the union. In recent visits to Zanzibar, Nyerere has reportedly been pressing Karume and the council to accept an extension of the Tanzanian constitution to cover Zanzibar and to relinquish their control of civil service matters. Extension of the constitution would provide for eventual free elections which the Zanzibar rulers would stand little chance of winning. On 24 April Karume and all other council members made a hasty trip to the mainland, presumably to discuss these problems.]

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NOTES

Ecuador: Leaders of three of the five significant political parties have decided to issue a manifesto demanding a voice in the new electoral law, elections for a constituent assembly on 4 September, and its convening on 9 October. This manifesto appears to be the opening gun in the political battle for control of the nation which will develop once a constituent assembly meets. The ability of provisional President Yerovi to carry out a smooth transition to constitutional government is questionable, according to the US Embassy, because of his weakness, the deteriorating economic situation, and the possible disruptive influence of followers of ex-President Velasco Ibarra.

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25X1

26 Apr 66

8

25X1

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistants to the President

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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The Atomic Energy Commission

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The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

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